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 
Where is logic heading today? There is a general feeling that the discipline
is broadening its scope and agenda beyond classical foundational issues, and
maybe even a concern that, like Stephen Leacock’s famous horseman, it is ‘rid-
ing off madly in all directions’. So, what is the resultant vector? There seem
to be two broad answers in circulation today. One is logical pluralism, locat-
ing the new scope of logic in charting a wide variety of reasoning styles, often
marked by non-classical structural rules of inference. This is the new program
that I subscribed to in my work on sub-structural logics around 1990, and it
is a powerful movement today.1 But gradually, I have changed my mind about
the crux of what logic should become. I would now say that the main issue is
not variety of reasoning styles and notions of consequence, but the variety of
informational tasks performed by intelligent interacting agents, of which infer-
ence is only one among many, involving observation, memory, questions and
answers, dialogue, or general communication. And logical systems should deal
with a wide variety of these, making information-carrying events first-class cit-
izens in their set-up. This program of logical dynamics was proposed in van
Benthem 1996. The purpose of this brief paper is to contrast and compare
the two approaches, drawing freely on some insights from earlier published
papers. In particular, I will argue that logical dynamics sets itself the more am-
bitious diagnostic goal of explaining why sub-structural phenomena occur, by
‘deconstructing’ them into classical logic plus an explicit account of the rele-
vant informational events. I see this as a still more challenging departure from
traditional logic. Diehard mathematicians still feel at ease with logical plural-
ism since it is all still a ‘science of formal systems’ describing ‘inference’, while
1Beale & Restall 2006 is a well-argued reference for the program of Logical Pluralism, and
its paradigmatic systems, ordered by ‘parametrizing’ their choice of a relevant set of ‘cases’.
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to me, inference is just one way of producing information, at best on a par, even
for logic itself, with others. But eventually—that is how my brain is wired—I
move from confrontation to cooperation, suggesting ways in which the two
views can pose new research questions for the other. In particular, inference
and consequence relations pose challenges to logical dynamics, while dynamic
logics in my style generate new consequence relations for pluralists to study.
Whatever you think of the ideology, the latter points are the main technical
contributions of this paper.
 
The first version of this paper was presented at a Conference on Logical Plu-
ralism, held in August 2008 at the University of Tartu, Estonia. I learnt some
things that suggested I might have been picking the wrong quarrel, making
the question mark in my title appropriate. First, pluralism seemed so broad
that it was hard to see if it would exclude dynamics. So, maybe I am really go-
ing to be contrasting, not Logical Dynamics with Logical Pluralism, but let us
say, broader ‘Informationalism’ with narrower ‘Inferentialism’. Next, as to the
latter, I was struck by the mantra-like repetition by distinguished colleagues—
even after I thought I had given knockdown arguments against it—that logic
is ‘obviously’ at heart about consequence relations. If that view is so defini-
tionally ingrained, maybe I should just give them the word ‘logic’, and call my
interests something else. That, by the way, also seems to be Graham Priest’s
main point in his comments to this paper.
And yet, I decided not to change the text of what follows. Instead, I
brazenly add one more consideration here, which has nothing to do with some-
thing as newfangled as Dynamics. The view that logic is really only about con-
sequence relations may have been right at some historical stage of the field. It
is also what we all write in textbooks to have a slogan for beginning students.
But frankly, it seems a view that has been patently inadequate for a very long
time. Since the 1930s, modern core logic has been about at least two topics:
valid inference, yes—but on a par with that, definability, language and expressive
power. In fact, many of the deep results in logic are about the latter, rather
than the former aspect: linked with Model Theory, not Proof Theory. And to
me, that definability aspect has always been about describing the world, and
once we can do that, communicating to others what we know about it. In
fact, there is even a third pillar of the field, if we also count computation and
Recursion Theory. Maybe it is high time we adjusted our self-image to reality.
1   
  Classical consequence P ⇒ C from a finite sequence of
premises P to a conclusion C says that C is true in every situation where all of
the propositions in P are true. Without displaying any logical operations in the
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language at all, whether Booleans, quantifiers, or modalities, this bare-bones
relation between abstract premises and abstract conclusions satisfies a num-
ber of interesting principles high-lighted in Scott 1971 and later publications.
These are the following structural rules:
if P, Q, R, S⇒ C, then P, R,Q, S⇒ C Permutation
if P, Q,Q⇒ C, then P, Q⇒ C Contraction
C⇒ C Reflexivity
if P⇒ Q and P, Q⇒ C, then P⇒ C ‘Cut’
if P⇒ C, then P, Q⇒ C Monotonicity
Together, these laws encode the basic ‘style of reasoning’ behind classical con-
sequence. It treats the data that feed into a conclusion as sets (order and multi-
plicity do not matter), the inferential relation is a pre-order allowing for chain-
ing of conclusions, and ‘overkill’ does not matter: accumulating more data is
not going to endanger earlier conclusions.
 ‘ ’ The 1970s and 80s saw a wave of other notions
of consequence, reflecting quite different reasoning styles. Well-known are
relevant logic (dropping monotonicity), default logics (dropping monotonicity
and transitivity), resource logics in categorical grammar and linear logic (drop-
ping contraction), and many others. Moreover, a general structure theory of
these inferential relations developed in the work of Gabbay 1996, Dunn 1991,
Restall 2000, and others, while Dosen & Schroeder-Heister 1993 coined the
term ‘sub-structural logics’. Van Benthem 1989 noted the analogy between this
abstract level and the agenda for logic in Bernard Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre
(1837) which did not focus on ‘logical constants’, but on charting the key formal
properties of different reasoning styles: deductive or probabilistic, in the com-
mon sense or according to strict philosophical standards. The term I proposed
back then for this surprisingly modern enterprise: ‘Bolzano’s Program’, has never
caught on, even though this original German-Italian pioneer continues to exert
an appeal to logicians (van Benthem 1985, 2003).
  An analysis of logical systems in terms of mere
structural rules has an attractive Spartan austerity, and the resulting hard-core
principles also high-light surprising analogies across fields. Still, one wants to
be reassured that this abstract proof theory has ties to some richer semantic or
practical picture. This is what is provided by the usual representation theorems,
of which there exists a great abundance—and I have dabbled with gusto in
this cottage industry myself (van Benthem 1991, 1996). Here is a ubiquitous
folklore example, showing the semantic bare bones of classical consequence,
writing blackboard bold-face P for finite sequences of formulas as before:
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 An inference relation P ⇒ C satisfies the above five structural rules iff it
can be represented by a map sending propositions P to sets Set(P) with P1, . . . , Pn ⇒ C
iff ∩16i6nSet(P)i ⊆ Set(C).
Proof: The proof is simply by setting Set(B) =def {A | A ⇒ B in the given
relation}, and then checking that the given equivalence holds by an appeal to
all given structural rules.
More sophisticated representation theorems tie further notions of conse-
quence to more elaborate semantic settings, beyond simple ‘set-intersection
plus inclusion’ patterns. Some examples will be stated later in this paper. I
will take it for granted that this wealth of notions and results provides a seri-
ous underpinning for logical pluralism today. There has been such a surprising
explosion of interesting notions of consequence in recent years that it is very
reasonable to focus on this spectacular extension of the scope of logic.
  Even so, in Benthem 1989, I voiced two concerns about an
exclusive focus on a level of abstract consequence. First, it seemed to be that
many observations in terms of structural rules address mere symptoms of some
more basic underlying phenomenon. For instance, non-monotonicity is like
‘fever’: it does not tell you which disease causes it. Thus, I was missing a
deeper analysis of the underlying phenomena as a matter of logic.
Matching this was a second worry. Sub-structural logics often arise from
‘giving up’ some properties of classical consequence, while retaining the old
formal language. But why not be radical with respect to the language as well, and
reconsider what we want to say? Admittedly, this happened with linear logic
and its splitting’ of classical connectives, and the same is true to some extent
for relevant logic as well. But, for instance, it has not happened with circum-
scription and default logics, and we will return to that issue below. In partic-
ular, when we add new vocabulary to a logical system, the original borderline
between ‘classical’ and ‘non-classical’ consequence may shift.
So, given this picture, and all these concerns, can broad-minded logicians
‘dig deeper’?
2  ,  ,   -

    When asked to explain what
logic is to a general audience, I often use the following scenario. You are in a
café with two friends, where you have ordered a beer, a wine, and a water. Now
some new person comes back with three glasses. What will happen? Everyone
agrees that three things occur in sequence:
First the waiter asks “Who has the wine?”, say, and puts that glass.
Then, he asks who has the beer, and puts that glass. And then,
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he does not ask any more, but just puts the remaining glass. Two
questions, and then one inference!
When he puts that third glass without asking, you observe a logical inference
in action: the information in the two answers received allows the waiter to just
deduce where the third one must go. One can spell out this final stage in terms
of a valid propositional schema
A∨ B∨ C,¬A,¬B⇒ C,
whose power can be seen at work wherever people are solving Sudoku puzzles.
But to me, there is a unity to this scenario which gets torn when we just
emphasize the final inference. The waiter first obtains the relevant information
by communication and perhaps observation, and then, once enough data have ac-
cumulated, he infers an explicit solution. Now on the traditional line, only
the latter deductive step is the proper domain of logic, while the former steps
are at best ‘pragmatics’. But in my view, all these informational processes are
on a par, and all should be within the compass of logic, which is about infor-
mation flow in general, not just deductive elucidation. In my book, asking a
question and understanding an answer is just as ‘logical’ an activity as drawing
an inference. Thus, logical systems should account for both, as observation,
communication, and inference occur entangled in most meaningful activities.2
But what is involved in this program?
     Our first task is to design richer
logics where observations and inferences live on a par. For instance, the answer
to the waiter’s first question reduces a space of 6 options to one with only 2,
while the second answer reduces this to just 1, the correct assignment of drinks.
Systems with explicit such steps exist by now in the form of dynamic-epistemic
logics, which describe both the information which agents have at any given
stage, and how their knowledge changes when they update their current state
with new ‘hard information’ (say, an authoritative answer to some question).
Also, complete axiomatizations exist for many such systems. Some details are
provided below. These logics can be developed in a perfectly standard man-
ner, so we really show that ‘logic can be more than it is’: the semantics and
proof-theoretic techniques that we already possess can describe observation
and communication as well as inference.3
2This entanglement has a historical pedigree. Traditional Indian logic distinguished three
principled ways of getting information. The easiest route is to observe, when that is possible.
The next method is inference, in case observation is impossible or dangerous, as with a coiled
object in a room where we cannot see whether it is a piece of rope, or a cobra. And if these two
methods fail, we can still resort to communication, and ask some expert. Similar ideas occur in
medieval Western logic—and even in traditional Chinese logic.
3 Admittedly, current dynamic-epistemic logics do not capture the dynamics of the waiter’s
inference: what changes does it bring about (certainly, it does not change the final semantic
state), and what are these good for? This famous difficulty of explaining ‘inferential’ versus
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 :      
But even this is just a start. To me, modern logic is about rational agency.4
This view seems a natural culmination of a century of philosophical and com-
putational logic after the great foundational era of the 1930s which focused on
formal proofs without any agent at all—or at best, a computer as a single-agent
device churning out new code. Rational agents have many ways of getting new
information, and use it for a variety of purposes. Both inferential and observa-
tional skills are essential here, including observations of a non-public character,
which permeate general communication, or playing games. But much more is
involved! In particular, as has been realized since the 1980s, in addition to
observation and knowledge update, there is the crucial formation of beliefs
that guide our actions, and the associated processes of self-correction that revise
beliefs when triggered by new information, ‘hard’ or ‘soft’.5
And this triad of observation, inference, and revision is still only part of
the story. We can only make sense of actions by taking preferences into account,
i.e., how agents evaluate situations. This is no ‘economic fad’: it is hard to think
of meaningful communication or inference without keeping track of the ‘why
question’ what it is good for.6
  We are almost there, but not yet! Consider
the waiter once more. Questions involve more than one agent, and their social
dynamics involves higher-order knowledge which is crucial to communication.
Asking you a normal question conveys that I do not know the answer, while I
think you may. And your answer does not just transmit a fact, but it makes sure
you know that I know, I know that you know that I know, and in the limit, it
achieves common knowledge,a central notion in philosophy, linguistics, computer
science, and cognitive science. It also underlies game theory, the best available
current model of intelligent interaction in general. Indeed, the ability to move
through an informational space keeping track of what other participants do
and do not know, including the crucial ability to switch and view things from
other people’s perspective, seems characteristic of human intelligence. Logic
is just as much in the others as in ourselves.
This social interactive view goes back to the very roots of logic. While
many people see Euclid’s Elements as the source, with its crystalline formal
proofs and eternal insights, the true origin of the discipline may be closer to
Plato’s Dialogues, an argumentative practice with clear patterns of confirma-
tion and refutation between participants It has been claimed that logic arose
‘semantic’ information has no final solution that I am aware off. Van Benthem & Martinez 2007,
van Benthem 2008 have proposed more fine-grained combined accounts of observational and
inferential dynamics.
4This is not quite sharp, since I view dealing with irrational agents, and ‘bounded rationality’
as part of the logical story, too. Maybe ‘successful agency’ would be a better, more neutral term.
5Revision is, of course, also the heart of the matter in more general processes of learning.
6Even in mathematical proof by professionals, keeping track of the point is a crucial skill.
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originally out of political and legal debate in all its three main traditions: Chi-
nese, Indian, and Western. And this multi-agent interactive view has emerged
anew in modern times. A striking example are the dialogue games of Lorenzen
1955, which recast the foundations of logical consequence, explaining validity
in terms of winning strategies for a proponent arguing the conclusion against an
opponent granting the premises.7
 ‘ ’  This grand program may be described
more technically in terms of a distinction between activities and their products,
which reflects a pervasive duality in natural language (van Benthem 1996).
‘Dance’ is a verb denoting an activity, which then produces ‘dances’ like a tango
or a waltz as a result. ‘Argument’ or ‘proof ’ is a logical activity one can engage
in, but it uses ‘arguments’ and produces ‘proofs’. Now traditional logic has em-
phasized products of logical activities, such as reasoning or seeing, while it has
usually kept those activities themselves behind the scenes, as the motivating
background stories. By contrast, the turn toward ‘logical dynamics’ is the con-
scious effort to make these activities themselves first-class citizens of logical
theory. The systems described above are of this kind, but so are belief revision
theory, ‘dynamic semantics’ (van Benthem, Muskens & Visser 1997), and many
other research programs.
    One way, not the only one, but cer-
tainly a good starting point, of creating process-oriented logics is by taking a
close look at any existing system of logic, and asking: what are the dynamic ac-
tivities or processes in the background? Thus, dynamic-epistemic logics arise
from asking what processes would actually produce the models that standard
‘static’ epistemic logic is concerned with.8 By now, there is a wide range of ‘dy-
namified’ classical systems, again with the above-mentioned ones as examples.
One virtue of this conservative approach is how it makes it clear from the start
that the aim is not to do away with classical logics, but rather to enrich them
and extend their natural boundaries. Ducklings can turn out to be swans.
  Even so, many colleagues have a defensive response to this
perspective, trying to fight some last stand of what defines ‘a logic’ as opposed
to a dangerous outer world. For instance (objections have varied over time), it
has been said that ‘real logic’ must be about consequence relations, from which
it follows that the dynamic perspective cannot be logic by definition, as it also
includes information flow driven by observation and communication which is
7In van Benthem 2008, I sketch how current dynamic logics of information update, belief
revision, preference change, and strategic interaction all address different aspects of this be-
haviour, which must be integrated. ‘Logic, Rational Agency, and Intelligent Interaction’ (van
Benthem 2007) then lays out this modern version of Logical Dynamics in greater detail.
8As a beneficial side-effect, such a model-transforming view also gives us a theory of system-
atic model construction for given epistemic scenarios, a topic usually left to the realm of ‘art’
and improvisation.
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not naturally cast as ‘reasoning’. Others say that logic must be ‘the science of
formal systems’ (a weird view, almost free of any exciting content whatsoever),
making the ‘product’ view sacrosanct. While this is largely an issue of termi-
nology, I find the objections interesting, because they themselves define logic
in the non-dynamic manner which I find so limited. As a logician (I hope), I
would say that the discipline of ‘logic’ is best described, not by any subject mat-
ter plus border patrols, but as that activity which is successfully performed by
logicians using logical notions and tools, wherever those take them. Moreover,
given the shifts in the historical agenda of the field, some modesty in claiming
what logic is in some essentialist sense might be appropriate.9 I mention these
objections, not because they sway me, but to show my awareness that Logical
Dynamics is one or maybe many bridges too far for most colleagues in the field.
     I think that Logical Dynamics is the liveliest
current alternative to Logical Pluralism, or at least to ‘Inferentialism’. Now
let’s get concrete. I will contrast and compare the two programs in three case
studies, starting from logics of observation.
3     
As we have seen, even in basic scenarios of agency, inference and information
update are intertwined. To get at that, in the above spirit of ‘dynamification’,
we first need a good account of the ‘statics’ here. For that, we take standard
epistemic logic of knowledge and related attitudes, including its current dynamic
sense (Baltag, van Ditmarsch & Moss 2008). Following that, we move from the
dynamic perspective to a consequence-based one, identifying a natural notion
of ‘dynamic consequence’ which we then analyze in detail as a sub-structural
logic in the ‘pluralist’ vein. Finally, we show how the two approaches are re-
lated, and how one might view the consequence approach as a way of seeking
natural abstraction levels behind a given dynamic logic of some agent activity.
3.1      
      The propositional base
language has operators Kiϕ for ‘agent i knows that ϕ’, interpreted over models
M = (W, {Ri}i∈I, V) where the Ri are epistemic accessibility relations among
the worlds for the agents.10 More precisely:
9Not just logicians have this response. At a recent meeting with cognitive psychologists, I
ran into opposition, too. When explaining that I wanted to study the logic of children’s mutual
knowledge and interactive strategies in card games and other activities, plus the steps by which
they make these more sophisticated in early childhood, I was told by eminent experts that this
was not about reasoning couched in language, and so, it had nothing to do with logic, and I
should leave this field to others. Just in case you are interested, the project will happen, and
logicians will be involved.
10‘Worlds’ here can be as light as hands in a card game, or the possible states of a traffic light.
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M, s |= Kiϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all t with Rist.
In what follows, we will write <K>ϕ for the existential dual of this notion.
Details of this framework can be looked up in any standard text, and we only
note here that we will use equivalence relations for convenience, validating the
logic of ‘multi-S5’. Another point is that we are not using epistemic logic as an
account of the philosopher’s notion of knowledge. As argued in van Benthem
2006, the operator Ki should be read as “to the best of agent i’s information”, view-
ing the accessibility relations Rias defining agents’ current range of uncertainty,
i.e., information states in the folklore sense. These ranges come with another
common sense idea, viz. that new information decreases the current range,
while ideal information is just the singleton set {w} with w the actual world.
 :    For our
purposes, it suffices to consider the logic of public announcements: events !P of
new hard information which may change irrevocably what I currently know.
These events can be linguistic communications from some perfectly reliable
source, or public inter-subjective observations. Formally, such an event trig-
gers a change in the current epistemic model (M, s) with actual world s. More
specifically, !P eliminates all worlds in M that are incompatible with P, thereby
zooming in on the actual situation. Thus the current model (M, s) changes into
its definable sub-model (M | P, s), whose domain is the set {t ∈ M | M, t |= P}.
In a picture, one goes
from M, s
s
P ¬P
to M | P, s
s
Typically, truth values of epistemic formulas may change in such an update
step: agents who did not know P now do after the event !P. This switching
leads to subtle non-trivial phenomena, but one can keep track of them in the
following formalism.
 The language of public announcement logic  extends epistemic
logic with action expressions denoting the preceding update steps:11
Formulas P: p | ¬φ | φ∨ψ | Kiφ | CGφ | [A]φ
Action expressions A: !P
11Through the !P and [A]φ steps, the two clauses of this definition involve a mutual recursion.
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The fundamental semantic clause for the dynamic action modality is as follows:
M, s |= [!P]φ iff M, s |= P, then M | P, s |= φ
When used with an epistemic logic for several agents, this language can
also describe the effects of multi-agent conversation and communication. In-
deed, it suffices for solving well-known puzzles like the ‘Muddy Children’ (Fa-
gin, Halpern, Moses & Vardi 1995), while also throwing new light on old philo-
sophical issues of verificationism (van Benthem 2004). As for a matching cal-
culus of ‘hard information flow’, since these ideas are still less familiar than
‘hard core’ static epistemic logic, we state what the complete logic looks like:
  is axiomatized completely by the usual complete laws of epistemic logic
plus the following recursion axioms:
[!P]q ↔ P → q for atomic facts q
[!P]¬φ ↔ P → ¬[!P]φ
[!P]φ∧ψ ↔ [!P]φ∧ [!P]ψ
[!P]Kiφ ↔ P → Ki (P → [!P]φ)
while common knowledge reduces to ‘conditional common knowledge’:
[!P]CGφ ↔
(
P → CPG[!P]φ
)12
These axioms are the ‘recursion equations’ of public information flow, per-
forming step-by-step analysis of epistemic effects of incoming hard informa-
tion. In particular, the final equivalence relates the knowledge that agents get
after receiving new information to conditional knowledge they already had be-
fore. 13  is a simple system of what is arguably just the common sense
view of semantic information. Even so, there is more to it than meets the eye,
including a bisimulation-based model theory (van Benthem 2006).14 Richer
systems of dynamic-epistemic logic (; cf. Baltag. Moss, Solecki 1998, van
Benthem, van Eijck & Kooi 2006, van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek & Kooi 2007)
deal with information flow in much more complex scenarios, such as card games,
where not all players have equal observational access to events like drawing a
card from the stack.
For the purposes of this paper, this further theory is beside the point. In-
stead, we now shift our focus to consequence relations naturally associated with
, to explore links with the pluralist program. Clearly,  has standard
12Van Benthem, van Eijck & Kooi 2006 define P-conditional common knowledge as com-
mon knowledge with accessibility restricted to finite paths consisting entirely of P-worlds, and
provide the full-blown complete recursion axiom for it: [!P]CφGψ↔
(
P → CP∧[!P]φG [!P]ψ
)
.
13Strictly speaking, this axiom system assumes perfect memory and other idealized epistemic
features of agents.
14Modern versions also include ‘protocol information’ about the total conversational or learning
process that the individual updates are part of (van Benthem, Gerbrandy & Pacuit 2007).
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classical consequence, but it also has others. Thus, we can also look at it as
generating new notions of consequence.
3.2     
Going back to the Restaurant example, here is a natural notion of consequence
associated with what took place there. One first processes the information
provided by the successive premises, and then checks the conclusion. To sim-
plify, consider the propositional inference
‘from A∨ B, ¬A to B’,
starting from an initial situation where the agent has no knowledge about A
and B. Here are the ‘updates’ for the two premises, ruling out 3 of the 4 options:
AB A¬B
¬AB ¬A¬B
A∨ B
AB A¬B
¬AB
¬A
¬AB
B
¬AB
Next observe that updating with the conclusion B would not change the in-
formation state any more. Inspired by this rather natural scenario, one can
define the following notion of abstract dynamic consequence (‘update-to-test’;
Veltman 1997, van Benthem 1996):15
 A sequent P1, . . . , Pk ⇒ φ is dynamically valid if, starting with any
epistemic model (M, s) whatsoever, successive announcements of the premises
result in a model where announcement of φ effects no further change: i.e., in
the model (. . . (M | P1) . . .) | Pk, s) the formula φ is already true everywhere,
even before it was announced.16
Modulo a few details, dynamic validity amounts to  validity of the fol-
lowing dynamic-epistemic formula, which says that the conclusion becomes
common knowledge:
[!P1] . . . [!Pk]CGφ (# )17
In the case of a single S5-agent, which we will consider henceforth for conve-
nience, we can replace the common knowledge modality CGφ here by just Kφ.
On the surface, this seems quite close to classical consequence. Indeed, the
following is easy to see:
15This notion is actually taught to students in Amsterdam, because it ‘feels right’ to them.
16This notion is ‘partial’: it does not presuppose that all premises can be truthfully announced.
Hans van Ditmarsch (p.c.) has suggested ‘local’ versions where we stop when the actual world
satisfies the conclusion, and he has made some interesting observations about dynamic conse-
quence involving this point—but my original examples call for the ‘global fixed-point’.
17 Here, validity refers to the Supermodel of all epistemic models related by arbitrary an-
nouncement steps. But when modeling more realistic scenarios of conversation or enquiry,
we can also relativize this to smaller restricted families M of epistemic models, with protocols of
admissible announcements. (Cf. Footnote 14.)
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 For purely factual (non-epistemic) formulas P1, . . . , Pk, φ, dynamic con-
sequence holds if and only if φ follows classically from P1, . . . , Pk.
But the special reason why this holds is the following: factual formulas
do not change their truth values at worlds when passing from a model M to
an updated model M | P. Things change when we admit announcements of
epistemic formulas, because then, truth values can and will typically change,
like when ignorance changes into knowledge.
 All classical structural rules fail for dynamic validity.
Proof: We give a few cases, all using ‘Moore-type’ infelicities of the form
¬Kp&p in making announcements, which lead to their own falsity. Permu-
tation fails because [!p][!<K> ¬p]K⊥ is valid (the first announcement leaves
only p-worlds; and so the second cannot be performed successfully), whereas
[!<K>¬p][!p]K⊥ is not valid: the initial sequence of announcements is per-
fectly consistent, so ⊥ does not result necessarily. Likewise, Contraction fails
since the update sequence ! <K> ¬p; !p is consistent, whereas the repeated
!<K>¬p; !p; !<K>¬p; !p is not. Finally, Cut fails as follows: we have [!¬p]K¬p
and [!¬K¬p][!K¬p]K⊥, but we do not have [!¬K¬p][!¬p]K⊥ valid.
Now, precisely the same phenomenon emerges that we already know from
general sub-structural logic. There are modified structural rules which do remain
valid in this setting.
 Dynamic consequence satisfies the following structural rules:
if P⇒ C, then A, P ⇒ C Left-Monotonicity
if P⇒ A and P, A,Q⇒ C, then P,Q⇒ C Left-Cut
if P⇒ A and P,Q⇒ C, then P, A,Q⇒ C Cautious Monotonicity
Now we are at the abstraction level of structural rules, and indeed, these
rules are valid in a much more general setting. We can view propositions A dy-
namically as partial functions TA taking input states meeting the preconditions
of update with A to output states:
TA
 Abstract transition models M =
(
S, {TA}A∈Prop
)
consist of states S
with a family of transition relations TA for each abstract proposition A. Here,
a sequence of propositions P = P1, . . . , Pk dynamically implies conclusion C in
M, if any sequence of premise updates starting anywhere in M ends in a fixed
point for the conclusion: if s1Tp1s2 . . . Tpksk+1, then sk+1Csk+1. We say sequent
P1, . . . , Pk ⇒ C is true in the model: M |= P1, . . . , Pk ⇒ C.
It is easy to check that the above three structural rules hold even for this ab-
stract setting. Moreover, van Benthem 1996, Chapter 7, proves the following
representation result:
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 A sequent σ is derivable from a set of sequents X by these three rules iff σ is
true in all models where all sequents in X are true.
The argument is a neat syntactic construction whose details we forego
here.18 This abstract analysis of a natural ‘dynamic’ sub-structural consequence
relation seems to extract the ‘gist’ of inference in dynamic-epistemic logic. But
to show that it really does, we need to tighten up the connection. Here is a
sketch of how this can be done (van Benthem 2003 has the details). First we
need to introduce the following generalized notion:
 A meta-sequent Σ A σ from a set of sequents Σ to a sequent σ
is update-valid if all its substitution instances with epistemic formulas, read-
ing sequents like before as type (#) dynamic-epistemic formulas, give a valid
implication between -formulas.19
 The update-valid structural inferences Σ A σ are precisely those
whose conclusions σ are derivable from their premise sets Σ by the rules of Left-
Monotonicity, Left-Cut, and Cautious Monotonicity.
Proof: Soundness is by immediate inspection. Completeness uses two repre-
sentation steps. One finds a counterexample on an abstract transition model
as above, and then transforms this into a concrete family of epistemic models
for the states,20 and concrete announcement actions for the labeled transitions
(the construction is in van Benthem 2003).
3.3    :     -

But actually, the leap from  to the preceding austere sequent-style analysis is
rather drastic. There are other natural abstraction levels behind our -style
dynamic-epistemic logic of agency. In particular, there is no reason whatsoever
why an insightful analysis of a notion of consequence could not have some
well-chosen operators in its language!
Indeed, the above transition models are really just models for a standard
poly-modal logic. The above notion of dynamic validity needs two basic kinds of
modality, viz. (a) universal modal boxes for the premise transitions, and (b) a
‘loop modality’ for the fixed-points:
M, s |= (a)φ iff Rass&M, s |= φ21
The modal loop language is decidable, and its complete axiomatization has the
following two key axioms:
18Such representation results involve a sort of hunt for ‘poor man’s completeness theorems’.
19For the special ‘universal Horn’ formulas obtained in this way, validity in the above Super-
model, or in arbitrary more constrained ‘protocol models’ M as above, makes no difference.
20To be a bit more precise technically, the transformation works up to modal bisimulation.
21Added to , such fixed-point operators add expressive power: cf. Baltag & Smets 2007.
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(a)φ↔ (a)T &φ, (a)T → ([a]φ→ φ).
Reading dynamic sequents P1, . . . , Pk ⇒ C as modal formulas [P1]...[Pk](C)T ,22
all earlier structural rules become very simply derivable in this language. But
the modal language can also express complex existential properties of conse-
quence beyond mere structural rules. Thus, poly-modal logic seems a natural
stage for a richer abstract theory of dynamic inference. Moreover, it still stays
close to the original setting of dynamic-epistemic logic, as may be seen by ex-
tending our earlier definitions for the case of mere sequents:
 The update-valid modal formulas are axiomatized precisely by the gen-
eral minimal modal logic of [a] and (a) for partial functions a.
The proof in van Benthem 2003 uses a representation of arbitrary finite
modal tree models into -universes with public announcements running be-
tween models.
There are still further natural abstraction levels than the two considered
in this section. For instance, going just one step beyond , we can ask for
the schematic validities of the system which remain valid whatever we substi-
tute for their proposition letters.23 It is not known if this is decidable or even
axiomatizable (van Benthem 2006).
3.4 :  - 
We have shown that the relation between abstract analysis of consequence
relations and dynamic logics of agency can be interesting and fun, giving rise
to non-trivial questions. One can look at this connection in two directions, as
in the following schema:
Dynamics ⇒ abstraction ⇒ Consequence
Consequence ⇒ representation ⇒ Dynamics
‘From dynamics to consequence’, the issue is to find good abstraction levels cap-
turing significant properties of consequence relations generated by the con-
crete activity modeled in the dynamic logic. ‘From consequence to dynamics’,
one reconstructs (or just brings out of the closet) the dynamic practice gener-
ating the given consequence relation, and this is what representation theorems
do. The two directions obviously live in harmony, and we can perform a Gestalt
Switch one way or the other. Moreover, as we shall see in later sections, this
dual perspective suggests many new research questions for (I trust) logicians.
The two directions might also be used to characterize historical periods in the
development of the field. The avant garde tendency in applied areas in the
1980s was toward abstraction, and maybe that of the current decade more to-
wards concretization.
22Note the difference with our earlier treatment of conclusions via common knowledge.
23Note that the stated reduction axiom for atomic propositions is not valid in this sense.
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4 -      

With this case study of knowledge and cumulative information update in place,
let us now move to the next level of agency in our earlier ladder, which involves
‘jumps’ in the form of actions of belief revision, self-correction, and learning.
This makes another major branch of sub-structural logic a test case, the non-
monotonic logics generated by default reasoning, circumscription, and the like.
This time, we reverse the perspective of Section 3. We start with abstract
formats for non-monotonic reasoning, and their dynamification in dynamic-
epistemic style comes afterwards. Finally, we draw comparisons again.
4.1    
Classical logical consequence from premises P to conclusion C says all models
of P are models for C. The famous insight in McCarthy 1980 was that human
and machine problem solving and planning go beyond this, getting more out
of premises by zooming in on the most ‘congenial’ models. A circumscriptive
consequence from P to C says that
C is true in all the minimal models for P
Here, minimality is taken with respect to some relevant comparison order 6
for models: inclusion of object domains, inclusion of denotations for speci-
fied predicates, and so on. The general idea is minimization over any reflexive
transitive order of ‘relative plausibility’ (Shoham 1988), much as in the Lewis
semantics for conditional logic since around 1970—an analogy often noted (cf.
Gaerdenfors & Rott 1995). One can study these consequence relations in terms
of structural rules, as has been done by many authors following Gabbay (cf.
Gabbay 1996).24 But conditional logic itself is also an interesting candidate for
a natural abstraction level, adding Boolean connectives, and it may be com-
pared to the above modal logic in describing consequences. We merely cite
one perhaps less-known extremely simple representation result to show the
spirit of working at this level (van Benthem 1989).
    Consider any set E with a binary order 6.
First note that the map f which takes a set X to the subset min(X) of all 6-
minimal elements in X : {x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ X : x 6 y} satisfies the following three
set-theoretic conditions:
24Cf. various chapters in the Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming.
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C1 f(X) ⊆ X
C3 f(X) ∩ Y ⊆ f(X ∩ Y)
C4 ∩i∈If(Xi) ⊆ f(∪i∈IXi)
Indeed we have an equivalence here:
 The following conditions are equivalent:
(a) f satisfies C1, C3, C4
(b) there is an order 6 on E with f(X) = min(X) for all X
Proof: From (a) to (b). Define a binary order as follows: x 6 y iff
x ∈ f({x, y}).
 f(X) = min(X)
Proof: The inclusion from left to right. Let x ∈ f(X): then x ∈ X by C1. Let
y ∈ X. Now in condition C2, take Y = {x, y}. Then we have x ∈ f(X) ∩ Y ⊆
f(X∩ Y) = f(Y), and hence that x 6 y. Next, the inclusion from right to left ⊇.
Let x ∈ min(X): i.e., for all y ∈ X, x ∈ f({x, y}). Then x is in the intersection of
all these sets f({x, y}). By C3, then, x ∈ f (∪y∈X{x, y}).
Likewise, belief revision theory started at this austere level in terms of the
-postulates (Gaerdenfors 1987), which merely constrain concrete rules for
changing one’s mind. The resulting theory of all this is well-known, and it
seems to support a consequence-based perspective, since belief revision theory
is often equated with non-monotonic logic.
Let us now move upward toward our Logical Dynamics program, and shake
the tree a bit. I would like to suggest that a shift in perspective may be
helpful—from a steaming jungle of non-classical ‘consequence relations’ to the
current world of modal logics for belief update, belief revision, and other in-
formational attitudesand informational processes. Maybe McCarthy formulated his
pioneering insights about common sense problem solving in terms of ‘non-
standard consequence’ for lack of an alternative vehicle?
4.2 : -    
  
Let us return to the puzzles that motivated non-monotonic logic in the first
place. We are given some initial information, and need to find out the true
situation. Extra information may come on the way. I submit that the most
striking phenomenon in such scenarios is not inference at all, but rather our re-
ceiving that information, and our subsequent responses:
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We are playing the board game “Kings and Cardinals” (the board
is an object of public observation) having ‘monasteries’ and ‘advi-
sors’ placed here and there. I look at the cards in my hand (a pri-
vate observation), and also at the map of medieval Europe on the
board. Right now, I know certain things about the outcome of the
game, and I believe more than what I strictly know, based on my
expectations about cards that the other players hold, or their tem-
peraments: timid, bluffing,. . . Now, new information comes in: you
select a new country on the map and place some counters there.
This observation changes my current information state. I know
more now, and the observation may even speed along further be-
liefs of mine: you are trying to build a trade route from Burgundy
to Bohemia. Of course, these current beliefs may be refuted by fur-
ther moves of yours, unlike the hard indefeasible knowledge which
I have obtained about what’s on the board.
Solving puzzles and playing games is all about such processes. But this is pre-
cisely the arena of our dynamic logics of information update, provided we can also
make them deal with belief revision. The very motivation for non-monotonic
reasoning seems epistemic or doxastic, having to do with managing knowl-
edge and beliefs—but this key feature is left implicit. We have already seen that
classical consequence is about the knowledge update that takes place when new
information comes in. And in tandem with this, I would say that
Circumscriptive inference is about belief formation25
which takes place on the basis of incoming new information. Clearly, knowl-
edge update and belief revision are intertwined, and they provide mutual sup-
port. I think it is this diversity of responses to information which truly explains
the modern galaxies of ‘notions of consequence’, where different styles live to-
gether. So, let’s look at some modal logics underpinning these phenomena
when we shift the focus to processing information.
4.3        
I start with the logic which is closest to minimizing non-monotonic logic,
though it may not be the most interesting one in the end. But we first need to
get some statics in place.
    Agents have other attitudes to proposi-
tions than knowledge, in particular, beliefs that may turn out incorrect. Logics
of belief analyze assertions
25I admit that there are some modern applications of circumscription where I do not find
my belief revision view conclusive—say, its uses in Gricean minimization policies in natural
language. But let me leave the refutations of my views to my readers, rather than to the warring
factions in my own mind.
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Biϕ for ‘agent i believes that ϕ’.
Their semantics adds further gradations to the information ranges in epistemic
modeling, in the form of a plausibility ordering of worlds x, y as seen from some
vantage point s:
6i,s xy in world s, agent i considers y at least as plausible as x.
In particular, we can now define belief semantically as ’truth in the most plausible
options’:
M, s |= Biφ iff M, t |= φ for all twhich are maximal in the ordering
λxy. 6i,s xy.26
There are some complications with making this stipulation work in infinite
models, but what we have here is the main idea. Incidentally, what we really
have in mind is that we look at the most plausible worlds among those that are
epistemically accessible to the current world. We suppress this fact notationally,
but it may be useful to keep it in mind when reading on.
 Consider a model with two possible worlds that are mutually epis-
temically accessible, but the one with ¬P is considered more plausible:
P ¬P6
At the actual world with P, the agent does not know whether P, but she does
(mistakenly!) believe that ¬P. It is crucial that our beliefs can be false.
For complete doxastic logics and more theory around them, cf. Fagin et al.
1995.27
Next, in doxastic logic, one soon finds that absolute beliefs are not suf-
ficient for explaining agents’ behaviour. We want to know what they would
believe were they to receive new information. This pre-encoding, in our earlier
sense, requires conditional belief:
M, s |= Bψi φ iff M, t |= φ for all worlds t which are maximal for λxy. 6i,s
xy in the set {u |M, u |= ψ}.
Conditional beliefs Bψi φ are again like general conditionals (cf. Lewis 1973),
in that they express what might happen under different circumstances from
where we are now.28
26Of course, working with ‘maximality’ is just as good as our earlier use of minimality.
27Most logics also analyze the interplay between knowledge and belief in information models
with two relations ∼i, 6j entangled in various ways, reflecting a stand on whether knowledge
implies belief, or whether one knows one’s beliefs. While relations between attitudes toward
information are an important topic, we focus on belief in what follows.
28The analogy is so close that conditional belief on reflexive transitive plausibility models
satisfies exactly the laws of the minimal conditional logic (cf. Veltman 1985).
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-     Now, consider the ef-
fect of the earlier events of receiving public hard information on agents’ beliefs.
Given the availability of conditional beliefs, we get this result from van Ben-
them 2007, comparable to our earlier :
 The complete logic of conditional belief under public announcements is ax-
iomatized by (a) any complete static logic for knowledge and belief,
(b) the  reduction axioms for atomic facts and Boolean operations,
(c) the following new recursion axiom for conditional beliefs:
[!P]Bψi φ↔
(
P → BP∧[!P]ψi [!P]φ
)
29
There is more to this system than meets the eye. For instance, the stated
reduction axiom does not straightforwardly reduce beliefs after update to con-
ditional beliefs one had before (a popular view): this will only be the case when
all propositions involved are factual. Moreover, scenarios of belief change un-
der update can be tricky. As has been observed in both computer science and
philosophy (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2008, Stalnaker 1996), true informa-
tion can trick agents from true into false beliefs, by ruling out most plausible
but non-actual worlds where some true proposition holds. Thus, there is room
for new notions in between knowledge and belief, such as ‘safe belief ’ (truth in
all worlds at least as plausible as the current one; Baltag & Smets 2007), which
has its own recursion laws in the above style. The present formalism allows us
to experiment with many doxastic notions.
4.4     
Now we return to the main point of Section 3. Like we saw there with informa-
tion update and knowledge, the richer epistemic-doxastic setting suggests new
notions of dynamic consequence. There are even two natural candidates now.
Both state what happens once the premises are processed: either knowledge
results just as before30—or we go to belief:
[!P1] . . . [!Pk]Bϕ
Given our semantics of belief, and working with factual propositions, the latter
is precisely the dynamic counterpart to minimizing consequence relations like
circumscription:
P1, . . . , Pk ⇒ ϕ
Indeed, our claim is simply this. Circumscription leads to beliefs rather than
knowledge, since its conclusions may be retracted on the basis of further evi-
dence. But then, what has traditionally been cast as a new ‘non-standard’ con-
sequence relation may also be seen differently through ‘dynamification’. Mak-
ing the dynamic setting more explicit, we have a dynamic logic of belief formation
29As a special case, this describes formation of absolute beliefs: [!P]Biφ↔
(
P → BPi [!P]φ
)
.
30This should be common knowledge in the multi-agent case, and likewise later common belief.
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under incoming factual propositions. Technically, the hall-mark failure of mono-
tonicity then occurs because of the minimization in the definition of belief—
not because of some special feature of the notion of consequence as such.
But this setting is also richer than the consequence view. First, the dy-
namic epistemic and doxastic language allows complex non-factual propositions
for premises and conclusions. The usual accounts of structural rules and the
‘intuitions’ associated with them do not seem to take this option of more so-
phisticated information into account. But the above calculus will keep all this
absolutely straight: we do have the complete logic for the total language! Also,
as we just observed, the semantic framework allows for new operators beyond
knowledge and belief, like ‘safe belief ’. And so it raises new questions. What
would be the new consequence relation associated with using safe belief rather
than plain belief?
Finally, in our next section, we discuss yet another dynamic degree of free-
dom in setting up consequence relations: the way in which we add the informa-
tion from the premises.
4.5        
     In applications of circum-
scription, one fixes a comparison relation between models, which does not
change in the process of inference. In abstract non-monotonic logics, this
choice is even left implicit in context, without a trace in the formal language.
But since comparing worlds by relative plausibility determines agents’ beliefs,
and hence their ‘conclusions’, it seems important to have explicit control over
how we choose, and change, that ordering. Indeed, triggers for changing beliefs
need not be ‘hard information’ of the public announcement type, ruling out
certain worlds for good. They can rather be ‘soft information’ affecting just
our plausibility ordering of the worlds!
A triggering event which makes us believe that P need only rearrange worlds
making the most plausible ones P: it works by ‘promotion’ rather than elimi-
nation of worlds. Thus, on the earlier models M = (W, ∼i,6i, V), we change
the relations 6i, rather than the domain of worlds W or the epistemic acces-
sibilities ∼i. Here is a well-known soft trigger from the area of belief revision,
sometimes called ‘radical revision’. A lexicographic upgrade ⇑P is an instruction
for changing the current ordering relation 6 between worlds as follows:
all P-worlds in the current model become better than all ¬P-
worlds, while, within those two zones, the old plausibility ordering re-
mains.
We have the following corresponding dynamic modality
M, s |= [⇑P]φ iff M ⇑P, s |= φ
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with M ⇑P the model M with its order 6 changed as stated above. This dy-
namic doxastic language describes how beliefs change under soft information
(van Benthem 2007):
 The dynamic logic of lexicographic upgrade is axiomatized completely by
(a) any complete axiom system for conditional belief on the static models, plus
(b) the following recursion axioms:
[⇑P]q ↔ q, for all atomic proposition letters q
[⇑P]¬φ ↔ ¬[⇑P]φ
[⇑P](φ∧ψ) ↔ [⇑P]φ∧ [⇑P]ψ
[⇑P]Bψφ ↔ (E (P ∧ [⇑P]ψ)∧ BP∧[⇑P]ψ[⇑P]φ)
∨
(
¬E (P ∧ [⇑P]ψ)∧ B[⇑P]ψ[⇑P]φ)31
The final equivalence describes which conditional beliefs agents form after
soft upgrade. This may look daunting, but try to read the principles of some
default logics existing today! And there is a reward. We now see explicitly
how new triggers affect the plausibility order 6 among worlds, and hence our
beliefs at any given stage, and thus, the ‘non-monotonic inferences’ available
to us on the basis of the ambient order 6. Moreover, the formulation in terms
of conditional belief at once solves the ‘iteration problem’ which has plagued
belief revision: we do not just know the new beliefs, but the above axioms also
completely describe the new tendencies that agents have toward further belief
revision.32
  Attention to the diversity of informational events that trig-
ger belief change is a typical feature of Logical Dynamics. Indeed, there are
many further ways of taking soft information. For instance, a more conserva-
tive form of belief revision puts not all P-worlds on top qua plausibility, but
just the most plausible P-worlds. ‘After the revolution’, this policy co-opts just the
leaders of the underclass, not all of them. Complete dynamic logics for these
and other policies exist, too (van Benthem 2007; Baltag & Smets 2007).
4.6     
Given these options in belief revision and plausibility change, which is the true
analogue of a circumscriptive or general ‘minimizing’ inference P ⇒ φ in this
31Here, ‘E’ is either a global existential modality, or the epistemic existential modality <K>.
32I am still not clear on one thing here: the above consequence relations do not use condi-
tional beliefs in their conclusions. But this may just reflect expressive poverty of the format. If
you want rules of conditionalization appropriate to your setting, then conditional operators have
to come in after all.
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dynamic setting? In particular, intuitively, are the premises instances of hard
information or soft information? We cannot tell, because we now live in a
richer universe of informational events that may determine how we solve our
problem, make our plan, or play our game.
The two options will not be the same, of course, and their different be-
haviour is described by our complete dynamic doxastic logics. Even so, there
is an interesting type of question, similar to the one raised in our section about
information update and knowledge change:
What are complete sets of structural rules for the consequence relations:
P1, . . . , Pk ⇒circ−hard ϕ iff [!P1] . . . [!Pk]Bϕ
P1, . . . , Pk ⇒circ−soft ϕ iff [⇑P1] . . . [⇑Pk]Bϕ
I have no answer, though I expect the theory of the first is a mix of the usual
sub-structural rules for non-monotonic logic plus the additional dynamic phe-
nomena in Section 3. But here is at least a structural difference between the
two notions, even for factual assertions:
 For factual assertions P,Q, (i) P,Q ⇒circ−hard P, but also (ii) not P,Q
⇒circ−soft P.
Proof: (i) Successive hard updates always yield subsets of the P-worlds. (ii) The
last upgrade with Q may have demoted all P-worlds from their former top po-
sitions.
How to choose between such alternative notions? It all depends on the sce-
nario of problem solving or game playing that we are engaged in. Indeed, our
logic provides many more, once we look at other plausibility-changing events.
And the shifts in that plausibility order are really the primary issue in under-
standing how we navigate through the task at hand.
4.7 
The intuitions behind circumscriptive inference styles involve knowledge and
belief. They are also dynamic, involving agents’ responses to incoming in-
formation. Thus, in a dynamic epistemic perspective, circumscription and
other styles of non-monotonic reasoning are at heart about cognitive attitudes
and responses to information. Moreover, these responses can be quite dif-
ferent, from hard information update to soft plausibility change. Merging
things in this way fits with the general conception of agency stated in Sec-
tion 2: processes of inference and self-correction go hand in hand! This perspec-
tive also generates new consequence relations, and new employment for their
sub-structural analysis. We see this as validating the perspective advocated in
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Section 3: what we saw with update and classical consequence becomes even
more interesting with revision and non-monotonicity.33
5   
   This paper has contrasted two programs for
legitimizing the diversity of modern logic. ‘Logical Pluralism’ emphasizes con-
sequence as the locus of research, and finding natural ways to parametrize it.
Its ‘strong arm’ is mathematical analysis of possible consequence relations. The
other program is ‘Logical Dynamics’, emphasizing events of information flow,
from inference to observation, and the various processes by which rational
agents harness this to act and interact. Its formal paradigm is dynamic logic
in some suitably broad sense. We have shown how one can move back and
forth between the two perspectives by processes of abstraction and ‘dynamifi-
cation’, and sometimes get precise connecting results (after all, we are in the
same field). Much more can happen here, once we put the research agendas in
the two programs side by side.34
But, I am not completely neutral in my evaluation. Even though I started
out in the 1980s on the sub-structural consequence side, I would now prefer
the dynamic perspective—partly because it is more ambitious, and gives logi-
cians many more things to do!
   ‘’? More specifically, we have shown in a specific
case study of circumscriptive-style minimizing inferences, how it might be le-
gitimate to question the original immediate impulse of McCarthy and his many
followers to cast things as a notion of consequence, rather than a process of
belief revision. What we saw in Section 4 is that, if we do, a non-monotonic
consequence relation may also be seen as a classical dynamic logic of the pro-
cess which causes the non-monotonicity. In a slogan, monotonic dynamic logic can
model non-monotonic consequence! The general scope of this slogan remains to be
understood, and it depends on successful further cases of dynamification.
   Actual research in the inferentialist and plural-
ist tradition also poses a number of unresolved challenges to the dynamic logic
approach. Perhaps the most obvious one are relevant logic, resource-sensitive
linear logics, situation-theoretic logics, and other systems that deal with both
information structure and information flow. These all involve a process which
we have ignored here, viz. inferential dynamics. And thus, they raise a largely
unresolved issue of reconciling the different notions of information that play
33Of course, it would add support to my general position in this paper if we could do such a
dynamified reconstruction of other non-monotonic reasoning styles, too: say, for abduction.
34This also raises issues. What are natural levels of abstraction for a given information-
handling activity? And, is not dynamification, which makes ever more things explicit in the
logical language on a slippery slope toward trivialization, viz. translation into some suitably rich
meta-language?
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in modern logic (van Benthem & Martinez 2007). This is all the more pressing
since my own earlier work on categorical grammars and information structure
was squarely in that tradition (van Benthem 2008 is a first attempt at putting
together the pieces of my life). I have nothing of substance to say on this here,
but it is a major issue to be resolved.35
Further exciting challenges to the dynamics program include para-consistent
logic and making its underlying processes of inconsistency handling explicit,—
which after all, is a natural companion to the processes of belief revision that
were highlighted in Section 4.36
 :   ? The background to this paper is the question
what logic really is. Some seek this in mathematical notions of semantic invari-
ance (Bonnay 2006), others in some proof-theoretic minimum of structural
rules that should never be violated (cf. Martin-Löf 1996 for a sophisticated
view of proof-theoretic foundational perspectives). To me, even Logical Plu-
ralism stays close to the traditional foundations of mathematics, as long as it
sees logic as being basically about consequence relations and formal systems.37
I see current debates as trying to break away from the magnetic spell of those
mind grooves formed in the grand foundational period of the 1930s. My own
current views were stated in Section 2, including a turn from proof and compu-
tation as paradigms toward broader rational agency and intelligent interaction.
But I provide no fixed definition of the new subject matter of the discipline,
because I find that the wrong place to look. In the spirit of Logical Dynamics,
I would also see the nature of logic in its features as a dynamic activity, not as
any static product of that activity: not even the above dynamic systems.

I thank Hans van Ditmarsch and Graham Priest for their responses, and also
the participants of the Tartu Workshop, including Stephen Read, Greg Restall,
and Dag Westerståhl.
35For instance, the dynamic consequence behind the categorical Lambek Calculus (van Ben-
them 1991) is this. Let propositions A be any transition relations RA between abstract states, and
say that P1, . . . , Pk dynamically implies conclusion C in a model, if any sequence of premise up-
dates starting anywhere in effects a total transition for the conclusion: if s1Rp1s2 . . . Rpksk+1,
then s1RCsk+1. (Contrast this with the dynamic consequence of Section 3). Interpretations
of these transitions range from syntactic concatenation to abstract information merge. Com-
paring this with the dynamic-epistemic view of events that trigger information flow is feasible
(I have some first technical results), but it quickly leads to major divergences from the above
bisimulation-based modal framework.
36Still more ambitious challenges arise with language change (reflecting conceptual changes) in
response to incoming events. The latter interest would go back to Bolzano after all, who did
include the choice of language as an explicit and crucial parameter in his pioneering account of
logical consequence.
37Even the wonderful modernist volume Gabbay 1993 channeled all modern discussion of this
sort into the mathematical issue of ‘What is a Logical System’? But maybe more pertinently,
Gabbay is also a contemporary pioneer in studies of rational agency beyond classical paradigms.
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